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1 Introduction
Many computer systems have reached the point where the goal of resource allocation is no longer to
maximize utilization; instead, when demand exceeds supply and not all needs can be met, one needs a
policy to guide resource allocation decisions. One natural policy is to seek eﬃcient usage, which allocates
resources to the set of users who have the highest utility for the use of the resources. Researchers have
frequently proposed market-based mechanisms to provide such a goal-oriented way to allocate resources
among competing interests while maximizing overall utility of the users.
The emergence of several large-scale, federated computing infrastructures [6, 2, 8, 4, 49], creates an
opportunity to revisit the use of market mechanisms to allocate computing resources. There are several
common characteristics of federated systems that make a market-based approach appropriate. First, the
end-users of these systems commonly have synchronized demand patterns (e.g., due to shared conference
deadlines or other external events), which makes excess resource demand a common occurrence. Second,
resource ownership is shared by the community, and therefore, there are many parties with a stake in the
allocation policies used by the system. Finally, there is a large number of resources, which means that
resource contention cannot be resolved by human administration or simply by the result of an uncoordinated
process. An allocation system designed around a market can lead to a socially optimal allocation outcome
to all users, which is particularly important during times of heavy resource contention. Markets also create
a natural structure for globally desirable incentives and user behavior and can relieve system administrators
from a signiﬁcant management burden.
In general, however, market-based allocation schemes have yet to catch on in practice. To understand
why applying a market-based design to these systems is a challenging problem, and perhaps why markets
have not been easily applied in the past, one can observe ways in which these computing environments
diﬀer from traditional markets. First, computing systems lack several natural market components. Since
end-users typically do not engage in the purchase or production of resources, they are not typically required
to use currency or otherwise barter for resource use. Therefore, many users are not accustomed to– or
comfortable with –determining their utility for a resource in terms of currency. Also missing in these systems
is a means of resource production. Since the supply of resources is often ﬁxed– due to external constraints
–and cannot easily be summarily increased or decreased in response to global demand, both under-demand
and over-demand of resources are common. A second diﬀerence between computing systems and markets
relates to the behavior of participants. Rather than engage in strategic, sophisticated behavior (which
can require costly modeling of other participants), end users in systems may prefer the simple interfaces
and allocation policies of today’s systems (e.g., FCFS, best-eﬀort), rather than needing to submit bids
and otherwise provide richer information in order to achieve what may sometimes amount to only a slight
utility gain [15].
∗This chapter is based on the authors’ following publications [44, 9, 17, 34]
1We present two case studies of market-based mechanisms that were developed to support sophisticated
usage policies in real computing environments, and designed to address some of these challenges. First,
we present Bellagio, a market-based resource allocator deployed for 6 months on the worldwide PlanetLab
research network [6]. Second, we describe Mirage, an allocator deployed on a shared sensor network testbed
[25], which is still in use as of this writing. We discuss our experiences with each system, and focus on both
the initial challenges these systems were designed to address, and the empirical successes and diﬃculties
that we have observed since deployment. A key contribution of these systems is their user-centric design.
Both Mirage and Bellagio use a resource discovery interface and a combinatorial bidding language to
allocate resources; the former allows users to easily communicate domain-speciﬁc resource demand, and
the latter allows users to express needs on bundles of resources, which is important in each of our applied
domains. Both systems also use a virtual currency policy that attempts to create incentives similar to
those created by currency in a real market economy.
Deployments such as these appear vital in understanding both the potential and limitations of market-
based resource allocation in computer systems. While our deployments were mostly successful, our experi-
ence also highlights a few persistent challenges with applying markets to these systems. For example, the
perishable nature of computer resources inﬂuenced the use of a sliding window-based allocation mechanism.
This formulation has side eﬀects of making the system unusable for a portion of users, and also allowing it
to be manipulated by others. In addition, choosing a level of system transparency to increase the usability
of market mechanisms also allowed users to exhibit globally undesirable market behavior. We conclude
with a set of suggestions to help guide future deployments of market-based resource allocation systems.
2 Background
During the past decade, large-scale, federated computing infrastructures have emerged as the primary
means for delivering signiﬁcant network and computational resources. By time-sharing communal re-
sources, users can harness the power of an otherwise unobtainable set of resources to perform a wide
variety of tasks. Computation in grid and cluster environments [22, 8, 7, 3, 20], wide-area distributed
service development and deployment [6, 2] of network testbeds and development in sensor networks [4, 49]
are all examples of common tasks in these emerging environments. Resource allocation continues to be the
fundamental challenge in these systems.
Traditional allocation approaches. Perhaps the most natural resource allocation scheme in time-
shared systems is proportional share, which provides equal, simultaneous access to time-shared resources
to all users. In this model, multiple applications can run on a machine simultaneously. It is well known,
however, that proportional-share scheduling alone does not function well in systems where over-demand for
resources is common. In particular, as demand for resources increases, the time-share per resource received
by each user decreases, while overheads remain constant (or, in some cases, increase due to thrashing). In
the end, the utility delivered to each user goes to zero as the number of competing users increases.
Batch scheduling is commonly used to schedule jobs in space-shared systems, such as supercomputers
and grid computing environments. As opposed to time-shared resources, space-shared systems are well
suited for applications which require a large share of a system’s resources (e.g., a CPU-intensive job), and
therefore, run a single application on a machine at a time. Most space-shared systems schedule jobs to
optimize system-level metrics such as total throughput or average job-turnaround time. These approaches
avoid the thrashing that can occur with high resource contention that occurs in proportional share schemes.
However, these systems typically do not account for the heterogeneity of users in their needs in regard to
scheduling jobs. For example, simple batch scheduling systems cannot distinguish between users with
jobs that require timely completion and users with jobs that do not. More sophisticated schedulers like
Maui [26] do include multiple priority queues, but lack an automated way to prevent users from artiﬁcially
inﬂating job priority. Also, the number of available job priorities is usually ﬁxed, which restricts the amount
of utility information a user can express for a job. These systems oﬀer no way to resolve contention for
resources in the face of heavy demand—conﬂicts are generally resolved through human intervention.Job utility functions. Maximizing aggregate utility, or value delivered by the system, requires
eliciting user preferences for resources over time and space [32]. The fundamental shortcomings of existing
approaches are rooted in the fact that they do not explicitly consider a user’s utility for a job when making
a scheduling decision. Consider the example of a student using a computing cluster who has a set of
jobs associated with various course projects. The student has an internal prioritization for the relative
importance of each job, based on the importance of each course, and the various deadlines for each project.
Therefore, she may be able to carefully craft her job submissions to create an ideal (i.e., utility-maximizing)
execution sequence. But, if she is sharing the computing cluster with a group of like-minded students–
each with their own job utility functions –it is unlikely that the entire set of students can coordinate to
craft a mutually agreeable schedule. A study of over one hundred users at the San Diego Supercomputing
Center (SDSC) supports the notion that real jobs exhibit sophisticated utility information [32], information
that cannot be explicitly communicated to the scheduling system. Despite the fact that SDSC uses a
sophisticated priority-based scheduler, the study highlights the fact that without explicitly considering the
utility function of a job, a scheduling system cannot make automated decisions that maximize the overall
utility of its users. A job utility function captures the value a job has to its user, as well as how this value
can vary over time, or other dimensions.
The idea of scheduling based on per-job utility functions is a well-trodden ﬁeld: the Alpha OS [19]
handles time-varying utility functions; Chen and Muhlethaler [14] discuss how to do processor scheduling
for them; Lee et al. [31] look at trade-oﬀs between multiple applications with multiple utility-dimensions;
Muse [13] and Unity [48] use utility functions for continuous ﬁne grained service quality control; and Petrou
et al. [40] describe using utility functions to allow speculative execution of tasks. Siena [10] considers the
impact of user aggregate utility functions to control service provider behavior across multiple jobs. Kumar
et al. [29] uses a single utility function to aggregate data from multiple sources. These prior works assume
the existence of mechanisms to elicit honest and comparable utility functions from a user. Similar to
priority job schedulers, a shared scheduling system needs a mechanism to prevent self-interested users from
artiﬁcially overstating their job utility.
Economic approaches. A well-designed economic approach to resource allocation can provide a
natural framework for users to communicate their job utility functions, and for the system to elicit true
utility functions from users. The basic idea is that resources are priced by looking to balance global
supply and demand, with users required to purchase resources using a personal budget of currency. In this
case, resource prices force users to self-select a resource allocation based on their utility for jobs, with the
implication being that the resources are allocated to the jobs that value them the most. Because users
must provide payment (perhaps in a virtual rather than real-world currency) in return for the allocation
of jobs, users will tend to be straightforward in describing their utility (measured in units of currency) for
diﬀerent allocations.
Market-based systems have long been proposed as solutions for resource allocation in these environ-
ments, yet integration of these systems into real computer systems has garnered little momentum. A
number of previous eﬀorts have explored market-based approaches for resource allocation in computer
systems. The earliest work that we are aware of is Sutherland’s futures market for CPU time on Harvard’s
PDP-1 [46]. Subsequent work can be categorized into two-groups: pricing mechanisms and auction-based
mechanisms. In pricing mechanisms, the system determines a price for each resource by using a combination
of various signals, such as load and resource demand history; users acquire resources by purchasing them at
market prices. In auction-based mechanisms, the system generates prices for resources dynamically by ﬁrst
collecting bids from users on resources that are then allocated, typically to maximize revenue to the bid-
taker. Past eﬀorts on market mechanisms work has been largely dominated by auction-based schemes and
has been applied to resource allocation in a broad range of distributed systems including clusters [47, 18],
computational grids [50, 30], parallel computers [45], and Internet computing systems [33, 41].
As with these systems, our designs (Bellagio and Mirage) also rely on an auction to allocate resources.
An auction is an appealing model for dynamic domains in which resource demands can be expected to
ﬂuctuate rapidly [16]. Recognizing that users of large-scale computing environments often require the useof combinations of resources [16, 21], we adopt the model of a combinatorial auction, in which users bid
on bundles of resources as opposed to individual resources. This ability to bid on resource combinations in
space and time allows users to more accurately express their preferences on diﬀerent resources. For example,
a user can express that some resources are interchangable (“substitutes”) and some are required together
(“complements”). To the best of our knowledge, Bellagio and Mirage are the ﬁrst deployed systems that
support allocation of combinations of heterogeneous computational resources via ﬂexible auction methods.
Of course, there do exist many alternatives to the use of markets in serving the purpose of resource
allocation in computer systems. These include ﬁrst-come ﬁrst served (FCFS) allocation and also reservation
systems that permit scheduling into the future. Despite our general belief in the importance of market
based methods, the ultimate success of a system is measured in usage, and usage depends on a number of
factors that are easy to overlook. For example, ease of use may trump mechanism features. People may
be willing to accept the limitations of simpler systems if market-based systems are seen as too complex,
or if they fail in other ways. This is one reason why it seems especially important to deploy market-based
systems and gain real experience. Through such a deployment, one gains a rare opportunity to deploy
a market and examine the interactions between participants in an isolated economic system. Uncovering
practical issues in a deployed computational market can lead to observations about the need for new
theory, which may then help in bringing the beneﬁts of eﬃcient, market-based resource allocation to users
of today’s large-scale shared infrastructures.
3 System Design
In this section, we describe the high-level design used by both Bellagio and Mirage. We discuss both the
basic method of allocation, and the virtual currency system used in both systems.
3.1 System Architecture
The goal of our market-mechanism is to determine an allocation that maximizes user utility (as measured,
for example, in units virtual currency.) If the market is reasonably competitive and bids reﬂect the true
utility of a user for a particular allocation, then by clearing a market to maximize the total bid value the
market will tend to achieve this goal of maximizing total utility.
The basic design of both the Bellagio and Mirage systems is that of a repeated, sealed-bid combinatorial
auction1, which allocates resources to competing users over time. Given that the winner-determination
problem in a combinatorial auction is known to be NP-hard [42, 43], we adopt a greedy algorithm to ensure
that the auctions clear quickly irrespective of the number of size of user bids. For this purpose, we adopt
a simple heuristic that greedily allocates (also called a “ﬁrst-ﬁt” schedule) bids in order of a bid’s value
density, which is the bid value divided by its size and length [11]. We repeat this allocation algorithm
k times, with a diﬀerent ordering of the top k bid value densities, and select the best allocation among
these k attempts. In our deployment we set k = 10. We adopt a ﬁrst-price auction format rather than an
auction with a more complex payment rule, in part because of our intent to make auction clearing as fast
as possible.2
In this setting, the auction is run periodically. Once bids are received the auction must determine
winning bids and the associated resource allocation. A user in our systems submits bids to the auction
using a two-phase process (Figure 1). First, she adopts a resource discovery service to ﬁnd candidate
resources that meet her needs. Second, using the concrete resources identiﬁed from the ﬁrst step, such a
user can place bids using a system-speciﬁc bidding language.
1The initial deployment of Mirage used an open-bid English auction format, which was later changed to a sealed-bid format.
2Furthermore, it is well understood that the second-price, Vickrey style of payment rules do not immediately provide the
incentive advantages that they enjoy in static settings when they are adapted to dynamic settings [37].Resource
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Figure 1: Bidding and Acquiring Resources.
3.2 Currency
Most existing computing systems lack any notion of currency. Because introducing real currency wasn’t a
feasible option in our target environments, we have designed a virtual currency system to be used in both
Bellagio and Mirage.
The design of a good currency policy will encourage desirable behaviors and serve to discourage un-
desirable behaviors. The lack of proper policies can render the system useless. For example, if users can
obtain large amounts of virtual currency very easily then they will of course bid arbitrarily high values all
the time. Such a system reduces to resource allocation based on social conventions, since there is no dis-
incentive for a user to not always bid the maximum possible value permitted within the bidding language.
Simply stated, the currency must be “real enough” that users care not to spend it because they will be
able to beneﬁt from saving unspent currency for future use. In order to support virtual currency, we rely
on a central bank that enforces a currency policy by controlling the aggregate amount and ﬂow of virtual
currency in the system.
Since users have no direct way of earning virtual currency, the system must decide how to distribute
the currency. Because users enter the system with no virtual currency, we also need to provide new users
with some initial amount of currency. In addition, as users spend currency over time, we also need a way
to infuse their accounts with new currency. Clearly, there are many virtual currency polices one could
employ to meet these requirements and diﬀerent policies will result in very diﬀerent economic systems and
resource allocations.
Our virtual currency policy is based on two principles: (i) prioritizing users based on an exogenous
policy (we will describe the speciﬁc policies for Bellagio and Mirage in the next sections); and (ii) penal-
izing/rewarding users based on usage or lack of usage during times of peak demand. Examples of factors
that may aﬀect prioritization include the types of usage (e.g., research vs. coursework), the amount of
contribution made to a system, and fairness concerns, which may be deﬁned in terms of the cumulative
resource consumption of an individual. Allowing the prioritization metric to be determined exogenously
permits ﬂexibility in crafting a good policy for a speciﬁc domain. In addition, it seems natural to reward
the user who refrains from using the system during times of peak demand (or, more generally, does not
waste resources) and penalize the user who uses resources aggressively when resources are scarce. Consider
a user who monopolizes the entire system for several days prior to a major deadline, for instance.
Each user is associated with an account at a central bank which stores virtual currency. Each bank
account is assigned a baseline amount of currency based on priority, a number of “currency shares” which
inﬂuences the rate that currency will subsequently ﬂow into the account, and is also initialized with a
baseline amount of currency. Given an initial currency allocation, users can begin to bid for resources in
the auction. Each time the auction clears, trades are settled and revenue is collected from the accounts
for winning bids. This currency is then distributed back to all accounts through proﬁt sharing in abaseline: 1000
shares:       80
Alice’s Account
baseline: 2000
shares:       20
Bob’s Account
Settlement Tax
80% 20%
Figure 2: Virtual currency policy.
proportional-share fashion based on the number of shares in each account (Figure 2). It is this proﬁt
sharing policy that allows users who do not waste resources to save additional currency which can be used
for a subsequent burst of activity later.
In addition to proﬁt sharing, the system also imposes a ﬁxed rate savings tax on all accounts that have
excess currency above their baseline values, again with proportional-share distribution. The motivation
for the savings tax is based on expected resource consumption. For example, in other distributed systems
testbeds such as PlanetLab [38], it has been observed [16] that resource consumption is often highly
imbalanced with a small fraction of the users consuming the majority of the resources and many users
often going idle for long periods of time. Similarly, parallel batch computing systems often exhibit a
diurnal load pattern [5] varying between extremes of light utilization and heavy utilization. Assuming
similar resource consumption patterns, and in the absence of additional policy, the implication would be
that heavy users would eventually be working out of accounts with very little currency even if there is little
demand for resources in the system. To mitigate this eﬀect, we impose a ﬁxed rate savings tax that makes
operational the concept of “use it or lose it” policy employed by agencies such as the Federal Aviation
Administration in allocating scarce resources; i.e., it is ﬁne to defer the consumption of currency for a
while but at some point it is desirable to allow others to gain the beneﬁt of resources that a user is not
using by redistributing some of the currency via the savings tax. Users should be rewarded for not wasting
resources, but such a reward should not last forever. In the absence of any activity in the system, the
savings tax works such that all accounts eventually converge back to their baseline values. The savings
tax is collected every 4 hours, at a rate of 5% of an account’s savings. These parameters were chosen such
that an exhausted bank account can recover half of its balance within a few days, and the full amount in
a week.3
By controlling the distribution of wealth in a virtual economy, the systems are able to indirectly
control the share of resources received by individual participants over diﬀerent time-scales, despite artifacts
introduced by the virtual currency and the continued presence of load imbalance. In order to control the
distribution of wealth among users, there are two policies that we must determine: how will users be able
to earn virtual currency, and how (if at all) will the system limit the wealth of users. We discuss the
policies chosen for our speciﬁc implementations, Bellagio and Mirage, next.
4 Bellagio
In this section we describe the Bellagio architecture and our deployment experience on PlanetLab.
3Kash, Friedman and Halpern [23, 28] have recently initiated a research agenda on developing a theory for how to allocate
virtual currency within “scrip” systems in which agents both contribute and consume resources.4.1 Target platform
PlanetLab is a distributed, wide-area, federated testbed consisting of over 800 machines hosted by more
than 400 sites across the world (Figure 3) [6]. Machines are owned and operated locally by each site, but
primarily administered centrally by PlanetLab Central (PLC). PLC performs access control and maintains
a consistent software image on each machine. Each site is in charge of the physical upkeep of its machines,
such as uptime and providing adequate and persistent network bandwidth. Additionally, each site pays a
periodic fee to PLC to support the central administration. In return, a site’s members, such as research
scientists and graduate students, are granted access to use any machine in the system. Each user can
obtain a slice, which grants her access to the resources of any PlanetLab machine. The instantiation of a
slice on a particular machine is called a sliver. A sliver shares basic information about its associated slice,
such as authentication keys and basic conﬁguration ﬁles, and is the physical manifestation of the user’s
isolated environment on a machine. A sliver is therefore intended to export an interface similar to that of a
virtual machine or other virtualization technology. As of this writing, PlanetLab implements virtualization
using the Linux V-Server technology.
Figure 3: Layout of PlanetLab resources as of 2008.
A typical scenario for a PlanetLab user is that she will ﬁrst obtain a slice from her local administrator
(by way of PLC). Once she has a slice, she creates slivers on any number of machines. The most common
use for the machines is as part of a wide-area network experiment, with each component machine acting
as an end-point or providing some other function within the experiment. The value in these machines
is not only in their local resources, but their geographic location; a wide-area conﬁguration of machines
provides a realistic setting for many distributed systems and network experiments. At any point in time,
a particular machine can be multiplexing its resources across processes from many diﬀerent slivers. These
tasks can vary in length (i.e., a few minutes to months) and in size (i.e., a few nodes versus all nodes).
Each machine’s resources are time-shared among active slivers using an equal-weight, proportional-share
scheduling policy. For example, if there are n active slivers on a machine, each active sliver is expected to
receive a 1
nth time-slice of a machine’s CPU cycles and network bandwidth over every scheduling window.
We call this type of scheduling work-conserving, since resource access is multiplexed among active slivers.
PLC performs limited admission control such that the number of active slivers on a machine is limited to
n = 1000 (i.e., no more than 1000 simultaneous slices can run on a machine). This constraint is imposed
due to the physical limitations on memory and disk space on each machine.
The need for a more sophisticated resource allocation policy became apparent during deadlines for the
major systems and networking conferences in 2003 and 2004, when resource contention became a persistent
problem in PlanetLab. Figure 4 illustrates a common occurrence for PlanetLab users. Due to synchronized
conference paper deadlines among users, the system experiences large spikes in resource demand in the
days leading up to a deadline. The proportional-share resource allocation policy provides users with little
control over their share of resources during such times, little incentive to reduce consumption, and even0
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Figure 4: 5th, average and 95th percentile load on 220 PlanetLab nodes leading up to May
2004 OSDI deadline.
less means to coordinate usage with one another. The end result is that signiﬁcant resource contention
leaves the system unusable for the majority of users4. Bellagio was designed to help address this problem.
4.2 Architecture
Bellagio makes allocation decisions using a combinatorial auction. We need to provide additional mecha-
nisms on PlanetLab to allow users to bid for these resources. In this section, we describe these mechanisms.
4.2.1 Resource Discovery
The decision to use a combinatorial auction rather than a series of single-item auctions is motivated by
the fact that most users on PlanetLab require simultaneous use of a large number of machines. Selecting
these machines poses a challenge to users because there is a large set from which to choose, and machines
– while largely homogeneous in resource capacity – often exhibit dynamic characteristics. For example, a
typical usage scenario would involve selecting machines that exhibit low load and an abundance of network
capacity. In addition, a user might want machines that have a particular physical network topology of
interest, such as within the same continent, or explicitly spanning continents.
Distributed resource discovery allows end users to identify available resources based upon both of these
characteristics. Bellagio uses SWORD [36] for this purpose, which is a resource discovery service imple-
mented on PlanetLab. It exports an interface that allows PlanetLab users to locate particular resources
matching various criteria. For example, users can search for resources based on resource-speciﬁc attributes
(e.g., machines with low CPU load and large amounts of free memory), inter-resource attributes (e.g.,
machines with low inter-node latency), and logical (e.g., machines within a speciﬁc administrative domain)
or physical attributes (e.g., geographic location). SWORD returns a set of candidate machines matching
the user’s description.
Once users submit a bid, there may be a substantial delay between bid submission and the actual
allocation. Because resources can exhibit dynamic temporal characteristics, it might not be useful for a user
to bid on speciﬁc machines that she has discovered from SWORD. Instead, the intended use of the resource
discovery mechanism is to express abstract resource speciﬁcations. Therefore, Bellagio alternatively allows
a user to specify a SWORD resource speciﬁcation (i.e., a SWORD query) in her bid instead of providing
details on speciﬁc machines, and Bellagio will resolve these queries immediately prior to determining a
resource allocation for users.
4Since the Bellagio deployment and discontinuation, PlanetLab has continued to rely on Sirius, a resource reservation
service. Current evidence suggests that resource contention may no longer be a severe problem [39].4.2.2 Bidding Language
The previous section describes how resources bundles are identiﬁed by users. This section describes how
users then communicate demands for resource bundles to Bellagio. In designing a bidding language, with
which users will report bids for bundles to the market, one needs to make a number of tradeoﬀs. First,
the expressiveness of the language and size of bids that can be submitted in a given language can directly
aﬀect the computational diﬃculty of solving the induced allocation problems [12, 35, 43]. But on the
other hand, having a language that is both expressive and concise for users can make their life simpler.
One consideration of relevance within Bellagio is the frequency with which auctions must be cleared. Very
frequent auctions would require a restrictive bidding language with simple, included allocation problems
while less frequent auctions would allow for a more complex bidding language and hard clearing problems.
Of course, less frequent auctions would also make the system less reactive and less useful for very impatient
users.
The particular choice of parameters were hand-tuned based on studies of PlanetLab usage [16] and our
own experience. As a result, the basic unit of allocation in Bellagio is a 4-hour time slot of CPU shares, and
the combinatorial auction correspondingly clears every 4 hours. In each period, there is a rolling window
of T = {1,2,3...,42} time slots forward from the current time in the auction (where T = 1 denotes the
immediately next time slot that will be available). We let N denote the set of resources available to allocate
(i.e., diﬀerent PlanetLab nodes). Note that immediately prior to running the auction clearing algorithm,
any bid that contains an abstract resource speciﬁcation (SWORD query), Bellagio translates the resource
speciﬁcation to a set of concrete candidate machines. The bidding language allows a user to specify a
required allocation duration, from the set D = {1,2,4,8} which represents the number of time-slots to
reserve. A component of a bid bi from a user is constructed as follows:
bi = (si,0,ti,1,di,{ni,1,ni,2,...},{oki,1,oki,2,...},vi),
where si,0,ti,1 ∈ T denote the range of possible start times for the bid to be valid, di ∈ D is the duration of
the job, {ni,1,ni,2,...,ni,k} and {oki,1,oki,2,...,oki,k} denote the required quantities ni,j ≥ 1 on resource
equivalence classes oki,j ⊆ N. An example of equivalence class is oki,j = {∗.princeton.edu}, where oki,j
represents the subset of PlanetLab nodes located in the princeton.edu domain. The corresponding ni,j
parameter represents the desired quantity of nodes satisfying this equivalence class. vi ≥ 0 is the bid price
(willingness to pay) for any bundle of resources that satisfy this bid. These parameters allowed PlanetLab
users to reserve CPU shares for a duration of up to 32 hours, and up to a week in advance. For example,
a user might request “any 10 nodes from Princeton, and any 10 nodes from Berkeley, for 32 consecutive
hours anytime in the next 24 hours.” A corresponding bid of value v would be:
bi = (1,6,8,{10,10},{{∗.princeton.edu},{∗.berkeley.edu}},v).
4.2.3 Currency Policy
The currency distribution policy in Bellagio is performed at a per-organization basis. Each site begins
with an initial balance of virtual currency that is proportional to the number of machines contributed to
PlanetLab. This policy was designed to encourage contributions to PlanetLab, and in particular to reward
those who contribute the most. If new sites joined PlanetLab, they were assigned currency in this way.
This is the only way that currency can be introduced in the economy. In PlanetLab, individual users
and slices are associated with a particular site or institution. All users and slices associated with that
institution have rights to the site’s bank account. When a user makes a bid, her balance is temporarily
frozen into an intermediate Bellagio account. Each time an auction clears, revenue is collected from the
accounts of winning bidders.
As described earlier, each bank account is also associated with a currency share which determines the
site’s portion of proﬁt sharing. Initially, the currency share for a bank account was the same as its initial
balance – the number of machines their site has contributed to PlanetLab. However, we modiﬁed this policyupon observation that certain machines in the system were used much more often than other machines.
We wanted a policy that would reward organizations which contribute the most valuable (highly utilized)
resources. Therefore, we revised proﬁt sharing such that it is only divided among each of the organizations
that owns a machine in a winning allocation; proﬁt (revenue) from each auction-clearing period is funneled
directly back to the account of the PlanetLab organization that owns the machine. One implication of this
policy is the promotion of long-term system growth. Users wishing to receive a larger revenue share will
now have incentive to contribute useful resources to the shared infrastructure.
Once the payment amount for each winning bid has been determined, the user’s bank account is charged
by the appropriate amount, and resource bindings are performed by returning resource capabilities in the
form of tickets to the winning bidders using a system such as SHARP [24]. Access to all resources in
Bellagio is guarded by resource capabilities. A resource capability represents the right for an application
to use a resource, and an application must present the resource capability to the resource in order to use
it.
4.3 Deployment
In the Summer of 2004, PLC provided the opportunity for research groups on PlanetLab to experiment with
more sophisticated scheduling policies. Beginning in December 2004, timed with the release of PlanetLab
Kernel version 3.0, Bellagio was given a fraction of each PlanetLab machine’s CPU resources, which it
could then allocate to diﬀerent user slices. For example, if a machine has n active slices, each slice receives
1
n time-share of the machine’s CPU. A full allocation of Bellagio’s share of resources to a single slice would
provide the slice with 3
n+2. For large n, the relative boost a slice could receive is 200% Therefore, for a single
machine, the full allocation of Bellagio’s resource can double or triples a slice’s relative CPU scheduling
share. We stress that the use of Bellagio was strictly optional: PlanetLab users automatically received a
default proportional share allocation; our system only sold an increase in these soft resource shares. This
particular resource boost is an artifact of the scheduling technology used by PlanetLab, and the amount
of resources that we were provided to allocate within our market.
Because we were introducing a market-based allocation scheme to a live system which previously
had no notion of markets, we anticipated the learning curve for new users would be high. The Bellagio
user interface was designed to encourage early adoption by the PlanetLab user community and promote
frequent use. In order to lower the barrier to for the user community, every registered PlanetLab user
was automatically registered to use Bellagio; a user simply supplied her authentication credentials to the
Bellagio Web interface, which were then veriﬁed against the central PlanetLab database. The Web interface
was deployed on a cluster of Linux machines with a PHP front-end and a PostgreSQL database back-end.
The database contained account balances for virtual currency and managed user authentication.
Once authenticated by the Web interface, a user could view the status of her account and previous
bids and allocations. To facilitate the bidding process, we provided several useful guides. First, to address
the issue of “valuation uncertainty,” which is an issue related to whether or not users will understand how
to value resources in units of the virtual currency, we provide historical prices in Bellagio as a reference
point to the current level of demand in the system. Second, to help formulate bids, we provided several
“one-click” bidding options, such as “bid on any N nodes in my slice” or “any N nodes from K distinct
Autonomous Systems.” Users also had the option of formulating complex queries by deﬁning equivalence
classes of resources on which to bid. And, as mentioned, Bellagio provided an interface to SWORD to
perform these queries, which is a tool familiar to many PlanetLab users [36].
Bellagio was released for public use on February, 2005. Each site was given a balance of 100 units
of virtual currency per node; the initial balance of sites ranged from 100 to 2200. During its lifetime, it
saw 23 bids from PlanetLab users representing 13 diﬀerent organizations, which has resulted in a total of
242,372 allocated hours of CPU shares. Bellagio was taken oﬀ-line in the Summer of 2005.5 Mirage
This section we describe the Mirage architecture and our deployment experience on the Intel Research
Sensor Network Lab.
5.1 Target platform
The initial motivation for this work became apparent during the construction of a 148-node testbed at the
Intel Research laboratory (IRB) in Berkeley, CA (Figure 5). This testbed is comprised of 97 Crossbow
MICA2 and 51 Crossbow MICA2DOT series sensor nodes, or motes, mounted uniformly in the ceiling of
the lab. The motes incorporate an Atmel ATmega128 8-bit microcontroller, 4KB of RAM, 128KB of ﬂash
memory, and a Chipcon CC1000 FSK radio chip. The MICA2 series devices in the testbed operate in the
433 MHz ISM band and incorporate a sophisticated sensorboard that can monitor pressure, temperature,
light, and humidity. The MICA2DOT devices operate in the 916MHz ISM band and do not include
sensorboards.
Figure 5: The Intel Berkeley lab testbed layout.
Users of a sensor-network testbed such as IRB’s are frequently interested in acquiring combinations of
resources; e.g., resources that meet certain constraints. For example, consider a machine learning researcher
who is interested in testing distributed inference algorithms in sensor networks. Such a user might be
interested in evaluating algorithms at a moderate scale while performing inference over temperature and
humidity readings of the environment. The user’s code might also be tailored to a particular type of device
(e.g., a MICA2 mote) and needs to run on a diﬀerent, appropriately-spaced frequency to avoid crosstalk
from other experiments. Thus, a user’s abstract resource requirement might be something like “any 64
MICA2 motes, operating on an unused frequency, that have both a temperature and a humidity sensor”.
5.2 Architecture
As described in the Bellagio architecture, Mirage makes allocation decisions using a combinatorial auction.
We describe in this section the methods that we provide in Mirage to allow users to bid for motes.
5.2.1 Resource Discovery
Similar to Bellagio, Mirage users specify the type of resources they are interested in using as abstract
resource speciﬁcations. A resource discovery service then maps these speciﬁcations to concrete resources
that meet the desired constraints. We use this level of indirection for three reasons. First, it frees the
user from having to manually identify candidate resources. Second, it allows users to automatically take
advantage of new resources as they are introduced into the system. Finally, as mentioned, testbed users
are frequently interested in acquiring sets of nodes and are often indiﬀerent to which speciﬁc nodes they
are allocated as long as the candidate resources meet the user’s constraints. The resource discovery serviceallows users to discover all possible candidates and thus provide the system with the maximal amount of
information on substitutes when clearing the auction.
Abstract resource speciﬁcations allow users to specify constraints on the types of resources they seek
to acquire. For example, testbed users often need to specify constraints on per-node attributes. In the
machine learning example earlier, for instance, a logical conjunction on per-node attributes (mote type
and sensor board type) combined with a desired number of nodes is required. In other cases, constraints
on inter-node attributes may be necessary. For example, a user might wish to acquire “8 motes where each
pair of motes is at least 10 meters apart” to ensure that the network causes a multi-hop routing layer to
form. Currently, Mirage supports resource discovery using per-node attributes including mote type, sensor
board type, and supported frequency range.
5.2.2 Bidding Language
The bidding language allows users to express desired resources and the value for those resources. More
speciﬁcally, a bid in the bidding language includes combinations of concrete resources, obtained via the
resource discovery service, that are equally acceptable to the user and the maximum amount the user is
willing to pay for those resources. Since time is a critical aspect of resource allocation (e.g., resources near
a conference deadline), resource combinations specify resources in both space and time. Formally, a bid bi
in Mirage is speciﬁed as follows:
bi = (vi,si,ti,di,fmin,fmax,ni,oki) (1)
Bid bi indicates the user wants any combination of ni motes from the set oki (obtained through resource
discovery) for a duration of di hours with a start time anywhere between times si and ti and a frequency
anywhere in the range [fmin,fmax]. The associated bid price is vi, representing the units of virtual currency
that the user is willing to pay for these resources. Continuing with the distributed inference example, a user
thus might say: “any 64 MICA2 motes, which have both a temperature and a humidity sensor, operating
on an unused frequency in the range [423 MHz,443 MHz], for 4 consecutive hours anytime in the next 24
hours”. Suppose the user used the resource discovery service and found 128 motes meeting the desired
resource speciﬁcation and valued the allocation at 99 units of virtual currency. The corresponding bid in
this case would thus be:
bi = (99,0,20,4,423,443,64,list of 128 motes) (2)
Mirage uses a greedy heuristic algorithm to compute the set of winning bids, similar to the algorithm
used by Bellagio.
The resources that a user of the IRB testbed cares about can exhibit both substitutes and complements.
For example, in the machine learning example, the user does not care which speciﬁc MICA2 motes are
allocated as long as a total of 64 of them are allocated. Hence, MICA2 motes are substitutes for one
another. Similarly, the user does care that 64 motes are allocated simultaneously. A partial allocation
of, say, 8 motes would not meet the user’s needs in this case since the user’s intention was to test at a
moderate scale. (The extreme case would be a partial allocation of a single mote.) Thus, the 64 motes can
be viewed as being complimentary to one another.
5.2.3 Currency Policy
As in Bellagio, each user is associated with a project that has an account at a central bank which stores
virtual currency. Each project’s bank account is assigned a baseline amount of currency based on priority, a
number of currency shares, which inﬂuences the rate that currency ﬂows into the account, and is initialized
with a baseline amount of currency. Priority and currency shares are determined exogenously, and mostly
based on the type of usage (e.g., research vs coursework). Most accounts have a baseline balance and
currency share of 1000, while 2 local users have a balance and share of 2000. Note that the proﬁt sharingpolicy diﬀers from the one used in Bellagio. In Mirage, the sensor nodes are all owned by the IRB lab,
and therefore, proﬁt cannot be associated with a particular project, whereas in PlanetLab a resource can
be directly attributed to a site.
5.3 Deployment
We deployed Mirage on Intel Research Berkeley’s 148-mote sensor-network testbed in December 2004, and
it is still in operation as of this writing. The implementation is comprised of three types of components:
clients, a server, and a front-end machine that users log in to and which provides controlled physical access
to the testbed (Figure 6). Clients provide users with secure, authenticated command-line (the mirage
program) and web-based access to a server (miraged) which implements a combinatorial auction, bank,
and resource discovery service. The server provides service to clients by handling secure, authenticated
XML-RPC requests using the SSL protocol with persistent state stored in a PostgreSQL database. Lastly,
the front-end physically enforces resource allocations from the auction using Linux’s per-uid iptables
packet ﬁltering capabilities. By default, all users are denied access to all motes. Based on the outcome of
the auction, rules are added as needed to open up access to users of winning bids for speciﬁc periods of
time.
mirage ssh ssh
miraged
sshd
SensorNet Testbed
Front−end
XML−RPC
 over SSL
XML−RPC
 over SSL Web Server
Web Browser
Alice Bob
motes 1,2 motes 3,4,5
HTTPS
Figure 6: Mirage implementation.
The auction is parameterized by several variables: number of resource slots, resource slot size, and
acceptable bid durations. Our deployment includes 148 motes where access to those motes is based on
1-hour slots, the minimum time unit of resource allocation. To accommodate users who might require a
range of diﬀerent times with the motes, users may bid for either 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, or 32 hour duration blocks.
To allow users who wish to plan ahead (e.g., perhaps near a conference deadline), the auction will sell
resources for up to three days into the future. Given our slot size of 1-hour, this works out to a total of 72
slots. Thus, we can view the resources being allocated as a matrix of 148 motes by 72 time slots. When
the system boots, all slots are available. Over time, slots become occupied as bids are allocated resources
and new slots become available as the window of slots opens up over time.
To use the system, users register for an account at a secure web site by providing identifying information,
contact information, a project name, and by uploading an SSH public key. Each user is associated with
a project and each project has an owner. An administrative user is responsible for enabling accounts for
project owners and assigning each project a baseline virtual currency value and a number of virtual currency
shares. Project owners can subsequently enable their own users, thereby eliminating the administrative
user as a centralized bottleneck.Users bid securely in the auction using either the command-line tool mirage, which acts as an XML-
RPC/SSL client, or through the web-based interface, where PHP scripts on the back-end act as XML-
RPC/SSL clients to the relevant servers. The command-line tool provides full access to the entire RPC
interface exposed by miraged. Use of this program is useful for various types of scripting and automation.
To accommodate users who prefer a graphical interface, the web-based interface provides a simple, inte-
grated interface to the system where users specify what resources they want and how much they are willing
to pay using an HTML form. The web server, in turn, maps the user’s abstract resources to concrete
resources using the resource discovery service and places a bid in the auction on the user’s behalf.
To use testbed resources, each winning bid results in members of the associated project being given
access to a speciﬁc set of motes for a period of time speciﬁed in the bid. Motes are made physically accessible
to project users through the front-end by doing the following for each project member: (i) creating a
temporary Unix login on the front-end machine using a global username (MD5 hash of the user’s SSH
public key), (ii) enabling access to the front-end via SSH authentication using an SSH authorized keys
ﬁle, and (iii) setting up ﬁrewall rules on the front-end such that only the user can access the particular
motes assigned to the winning bid.
In the ﬁrst six months of usage, 18 diﬀerent research projects were registered to use the system and
322 bids were submitted resulting in a total of 312,148 allocated node hours.
6 Experiences
The goal of both Bellagio and Mirage is to provide an allocation policy that increases the aggregate utility
of its users. But it can be challenging to measure our success in reaching this goal. Although we have
real workload data from which we can quantify the aggregate utility (in units of virtual currency) of our
scheduling policy on our target users, it is diﬃcult to quantify the aggregate utility of a diﬀerent scheduling
policy using the same workload data. The problem is that there may have been bids that were withdrawn,
repeated or simply not submitted in the Bellagio and Mirage workload data. If we cannot account for
the absent (or duplicated) resource requests, we cannot accurately reconstruct a workload stream that
would have been presented to a more traditional scheduling policy, such as FCFS or proportional-share
schedulers. Nevertheless, our data contains suﬃcient information that demonstrates the our market-based
systems likely do increase utility in both domains. We explain this next.
Figure 7 indicates that resource contention continues to persist on the IRB sensor network testbed, as
it had prior to the deployment of Mirage. We can see that during times of heavy system load, the bidding
process is able to allocate resources at a higher price (Figure 8), and resolves contention by allocating the
scarce resource supply to users who valued them the most. Figure 9 demonstrates that individual users
place bids that range over four orders of magnitude. From this data, we can conclude that users indeed
place diﬀerent levels of priority on resources (assuming that the bids don’t represent grossly misstated
valuations) at diﬀerent times, which suggests that extracting this information can improve the allocation
eﬃciency of a system, i.e. the total utility achieved by its user base.
Similar observations about resource valuation were made from our deployment on Bellagio, however the
data is signiﬁcantly less reliable because of the few data points available from deployment. As emphasized
in the description of the deployment, use of Bellagio was strictly optional to PlanetLab users. As a result,
the market did not capture the full demand of the system. In particular, when overall system demand was
low, there was virtually no activity on Bellagio. This lack of activity was primarily due to the availability
of free resources (i.e., those machine shares not allocated by the market), and in fact ultimately lead to
Bellagio being taken oﬄine. We see this result as an artifact of the opt-in nature of Bellagio, and not a
negative result about the applicability of a market-based scheduler on the PlanetLab domain.
This example also serves to illustrate that users will often choose an easier-to-user approach, even if it
results in slightly less utility. One particular burden of our auction-based approach is the artiﬁcial delay
to node allocations. Since auctions are run every hour, allocations to winning bids are correspondingly
delayed until the hour. There is a trade-oﬀ here between imposing little delay on users and maximizing the0
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Figure 7: Testbed utilization for 97 MICA2 motes.
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Figure 10: Distribution of delay and patience from bids submitted to Mirage from January 20
to March 22, 2005.
eﬃciency of an allocation: increasing the frequency of auctions reduces the delay imposed on users, but it
also reduces the amount of demand information captured in an auction, potentially reducing the quality
of the allocation.
In Mirage, the auction-clearing period of 1 hour was designed to mitigate the impact of the imposed
auction delay. However, based on the available data, we observe that a signiﬁcant fraction of the bids from
users could not be satisﬁed given the 1-hour delay. Each bid in Mirage includes both a delay and patience
ﬁeld, indicating an earliest start time and latest start time allowed for an allocation. These ﬁelds are used
to communicate time-based constraints such as a deadline for an allocation. Figure 10 indicates that 10%
of user bids could not wait for the 1-hour duration. This eﬀect was more obvious in Bellagio, where a
majority of PlanetLab users chose not to bid at all.
Bellagio and Mirage were both designed to reduce the usage overhead imposed on the users. In Mirage,
we provided some information transparency by using a ﬁrst-price, open auction in order to help guide
user bidding behavior. Despite the potential for strategic manipulation in an open auction, we decided
to prioritize our goals for usability and eﬃciency improvement over incentive-compatibility. Perhaps not
unexpectedly, users not only learned how to use the system eﬀectively, but a few users eventually developed
strategies to manipulate allocations in their favor. These results provide evidence that some end users may
exhibit the sophisticated usage patterns of rational economic agents and serves to justify the use of market
based methods in seeking to address these kinds of manipulations. The following are descriptions of the
four primary bidding behaviors that we observed during the initial Mirage deployment.
Behavior 1: underbidding based on current demand. Since all outstanding bids in our initial deploy-
ment were publicly visible, users could observe periods with low demand and submit low bids in these
periods. For example, one user would frequently bid a low value, such as 1 or 2 when no other bids were
present. Underbidding is not necessarily a problem in this situation, because it can still result in a utility-
maximizing allocation; e.g., if supply exceeds demand then all interested users receive an allocation. This
can be a problem in for-proﬁt systems, however, where it would be important to use a reserve price to
provide good revenue properties. Moreover, it suggests that users need to be strategic in thinking about
how and when to bid, which indicates that such a system might be diﬃcult to use.
Behavior 2: iterative bidding. The possibility of user underbidding coupled with uncertainty about
the bid values of other users results in “iterative” bidding, i.e. a behavior in which a user adjusts her
bids while an auction remains open and in response to price feedback. This poses a problem for system
performance in Mirage because the auctions need to have a deﬁnite closing time (because the associated
resources are perishable), and users may still be adjusting their bids when an auction closes. The impact
of this strategy is a potential eﬃciency loss in the allocation.
Behavior 3: rolling window manipulation. Unlike auctions for tangible goods, resource allocation in
computer systems are not allocated permanently, but rather allocated for particular intervals of time. Sincemany experiments by Mirage users can span several days, we permitted users to bid for allocation blocks
of 1, 2, ..., or 32 hours in size. In order to allow users to plan in advance, we auctioned oﬀ resources
over a rolling window of 72 hours into the future. In periods of overdemand (e.g., during the SenSys 2005
conference deadline) the entire window of resources becomes fully allocated, and we found that the design
of the rolling window can lead to unintended consequences. For example, consider a scenario with only
two users, A and B, where user A requires a 4-hour block of nodes, and user B requires only a 2-hour
block. If the window of resources is fully allocated, user A must wait at least 4 hours before a contiguous
4-hour block is available. However, after only 2 hours, user B will win her allocation, regardless of her
valuation relative to user A’s. Furthermore, if user B continues this behavior, it is possible that user A
will be starved indeﬁnitely. During times of heavy resource load, we observed that no bids involving a
block larger than 2-hours could be satisﬁed. It is possible that there were outstanding bids involving larger
blocks and proportionally larger bid amounts that could not be allocated because of the rolling window.
Given the negative impact of these observed user behaviors, we responded by adjusting the auction
protocol in Mirage. First, we instituted a sealed-bid auction format, thereby discouraging Behaviors 1
and 2. We also responded to Behavior 3 by increasing the allowable time window to be 104 hours, with
bid start times constrained to be within the next 72 hours. To understand the rationale for this change,
consider the following example. Assume that we have two users, A and B, where user A requires a 32-hour
block of nodes (the maximum allowed in Mirage), and user B requires a 16-hour block of nodes. If the
entire 72-hour window is allocated, the next available 32-hour block occurs 104 hours in the future. By
expanding the rolling window to 104 hours and restricting the last 32 hours (of the window) from being
reserved, bids from both user A and B will be considered for the next available 32-hour block. Under the
original auction format, the bid from user B would win the allocation before the bid from user A could
even be considered.
Time Project Value #Nodes #Hours
04-02-2005 03:58:04 user B 1590 97 32
04-02-2005 05:05:45 user A 5 24 4
04-02-2005 05:28:23 user A 130 40 4
04-02-2005 06:12:12 user A 1 33 4
Table 1: Behavior 4 on 97 MICA2 motes.
Behavior 4: auction sandwich attack. While our changes eliminated Behavior 3 and signiﬁcantly
reduced Behaviors 1 and 2, a fourth behavior exploited the available information about awarded alloca-
tions. In the so-called “auction sandwich” attack, a user exploits two pieces of information: (i) historical
information on previous winning bids to estimate the current workload and (ii) the greedy nature of the
auction clearing algorithm. In this particular case, we observed a user employing a strategy of splitting a
bid for 97 MICA2 motes across several bids, only one of which has a high value per node hour. During
times of high resource demand, most users request a majority of nodes (most often all 97 motes, since a
conference deadline requires large-scale experiments). Since Mirage uses a greedy (ﬁrst-ﬁt) heuristic in its
auction-clearing algorithm, the user’s single high value bid is likely to win and because the bids from other
users are then blocked and unable to ﬁt in the remaining available slots, her other low-valued bids ﬁll the
remaining slots. We produce an actual occurrence of this behavior in Table 1. Here, user A submits three
bids, the main one being a bid with value 130 (value per node hour 130/(4 · 40) = 0.813) and used to
outbid a bid from user B, with value 1590 (value per node hour 1590/(32 · 97) = 0.0512). Once the high
valued 40-node bid has occupied its portion of the resource window, no other 97-node bids can be matched.
Consequently, the user wins the remaining 57 nodes using two bids: a 24-node bid and a 33-node bid, both
at low bid prices.7 Concluding Remarks
From our deployments, we have seen that a market-based allocation system can signiﬁcantly reduce the
management burden and simultaneously improve user satisfaction on large-scale federated infrastructures.
The allocation decisions in Bellagio and Mirage are autonomously driven by user-provided job util-
ity information, with very limited human intervention; when user behavior is properly constrained, the
scheduling policies can lead to utility-maximizing resource allocations. While market-based systems have
not yet seen widespread adoption, we believe that further eﬀorts to deploy and study live systems will
promote more support in the research and systems community, and can ultimately achieve the goal of
more eﬃcient utilization of today’s computing platforms.
Overall, we made the following observations in this chapter:
Markets can increase allocation eﬃciency, but only if users behave properly. It can be
diﬃcult to rigorously compare the eﬃciency of two diﬀerent allocation policies because the workload
data that would be generated by each policy are diﬀerent. However, from the Mirage deployment, we
have demonstrated several scenarios where markets can be expected to outperform traditional allocation
policies. One important aspect of this is the observation that even in large-scale infrastructures, resource
demand often exceeds resource supply: in both Mirage and Bellagio, there are unavoidable periods of
time where users’ resource demands overlap, creating a situation where the system must arbitrate among
them. We have observed user bids varying by several orders of magnitude, indicating that there is room
to make intelligent (and therefore, unintelligent) allocation decisions. Well-designed markets will promote
a socially optimal allocation for the actual supply and demand conditions. In the case of Mirage, we
saw that strategic behavior from a subset of users could potentially decrease the utility of the allocation
to other users. By adjusting the allocation policy, we were able to limit the opportunities for strategic
manipulation, and mitigate this negative impact on well-behaved Mirage users.
Users are able to utilize market-based methods and will follow sophisticated behaviors if
given suﬃcient incentive. There exist many simpler alternatives to markets for the design of methods
for resource allocation; e.g., traditional methods that do not require the provision of bid information
to describe demands by users. We have hypothesized that users might sometimes prefer this simplicity
over the potential beneﬁts of a market. But we have also observed that given enough incentive, users
are willing to put forth the eﬀort to use a market system. In Bellagio, we saw that there was neither
enough pressure or suﬃcient incentive to use the market, and the vast majority of users opted for the
simpler proportional allocation scheme in PlanetLab and were willing to forego any additional resources
that Bellagio could provide. On the other hand, users in Mirage were given no alternative for obtaining
a sensor node allocations. While ﬁnding that users were able to utilize the market-based system, we also
observed both simple and strategic behavior, with the latter providing a (sometimes successful) attempt
to manipulate allocations in their favor.
Our deployment experience has also highlighted a few key obstacles that can be addressed by future
research:
Mechanisms with faster response time. In the course of the Bellagio deployment, we learned that
many users prefer immediate use (i.e., standard best-eﬀort, proportional-share) over a potentially larger
resource allocation (acquired from bidding). In Mirage, we also observed that many users required more
immediacy for a signiﬁcant fraction of their resource requests. As alluded to earlier, there is a trade-oﬀ
between oﬀering a resource immediately and the eﬃciency gained from delaying an allocation decision.
A hybrid mechanism, such as buy-it-now pricing on eBay [1], may provide a compromise between these
desired properties.
Low-cost mechanism or highly-valued resources. In the Bellagio deployment, we learned that
the resources made available through the auction were not valuable enough to users to justify expending the
eﬀort to obtain them. Many PlanetLab experiments are bottle-necked by other resources such as memory
or disk bandwidth and obtaining a few extra soft CPU shares is of little value. A market mechanism must
either provide a resource of obvious and signiﬁcant value to the end-user, or impose a low enough cost toa user to justify its adoption. In Mirage, the market is the only means to obtain a sensor node, but having
a market with a low cost of use was nevertheless important in promoting its adoption in the ﬁrst place.
Strategyproof methods. As we saw in Behavior 4 from the Mirage deployment, some users will
try and can also succeed in exploiting the particular characteristics of a market design. In promoting
simplicity for users and also robustness and predictability for system designers, it can be helpful to deploy
non-manipulable are “strategyproof” methods. There is a developing literature on the design of such
mechanisms for dynamic environments (see Parkes [37] for a recent survey), and it will be of interest to
continue to seek to adopt these methods within computer systems [27].
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